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A NAZI WAR CRIMINAL AS A STANDARD BEARER FOR
GENDER EQUALITY? - THE STRANGE SAGA OF JOHANN
BREYER
The modern judicial system's willingness to shield American
women from any form of invidious gender-based discrimination and
to demand the equal protection of the laws for all, is perhaps best
evidenced by a recent courageous decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Breyer v. Meissner.' In this
decision, the court upheld the claim of Johann Breyer, an admitted
Nazi war criminal who had persecuted thousands in the hellish
concentration camps of the Second World War, to American
citizenship through his American-born mother.
The Third Circuit ruled that two Acts of Congress
unconstitutionally discriminated against an American-born woman
on the basis of her gender, with the effect of depriving her son of
American citizenship at birth.2 The first act, Section 1993 of the
Revised Statutes of 1874,' allowed only American citizen fathers to
pass their citizenship to their offspring born abroad, while
preventing American citizen mothers from doing the same. The
second act, Section 101(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality
Technical Corrections Act ("INTCA") of 1994' made Section 1993
officially gender neutral, but specifically reserved the right to
prevent American citizen mothers from passing on their citizenship
to their foreign born offspring who would eventually participate in
the crimes against humanity inflicted by the Nazis upon Europe in
the Second World War.
1. 214 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2000).
2. Id. at 429.
3. Rev. Stat. § 1993 (1874) (reenactment of Act of Feb. 10, 1855, ch. 71, § 1, 10 Stat. 604).
The text of the statute provides:
All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction
of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth
citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights
of citizenship shall not to descend to children whose fathers never resided in the
United States.
Wauchope v. U.S. Dept. of State, 985 F.2d 1407, 1410 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1993)(quoting Rev. Stat.
§1993 (1874)Xemphasis added).
4. Pub. L. No. 103-416, sec 101(c), 108 Stat. 4306 (1994) (current version at 8 USC
§1401(c)). Section 101(cXl) eliminated the gender-based distinction inherent in Section 1993,
supra (conferring citizenship at birth to all persons born to an American mother or father),
but mandated that the imposition of gender neutrality "shall not confer citizenship on, or
affect the validity of any denaturalization, deportation, or exclusion action against, any
person who ... was excluded from, or who would not have been eligible for admission to, the
United States under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 .... " Id.
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The Third Circuit's declaration that both acts of Congress were
unconstitutional violations of a mother's equal protection rights
shows that even the most heinous of human beings deserve
protection from invidious gender-based discrimination, even at the
price of allowing a participant in the Holocaust to claim status as
a United States citizen. Part I of this note examines the nature of
Johann Breyer's wartime activities in the context of the Holocaust
and the problem of Nazi war criminals immigrating to the United
States in the chaotic aftermath of the Second World War. Part II of
this note explores the ineffectual legislative attempts to exclude
Nazis from the immigration process and will demonstrate how
Johann Breyer's entry into the United States typifies the failings of
the system. Part III examines the legal standards governing the
later attempts by the United States government to denaturalize
and remove those Nazi war criminals who had gained entry into the
United States. Finally, Part IV of this note examines the litigation
surrounding Johann Breyer's successful bid to obtain American
citizenship through the assertion of his mother's equal protection
rights, and the Third Circuit's courageous protection of her right to
pass on that citizenship, even to a son who would become a
participant in what one scholar has termed, "the ultimate evil."5
BACKGROUND AND WARTIME ACTIVITIES OF JOHANN BREYER
Johann Breyer was born on May 30, 1925, in the small farming
village of Nova Lensa, in what was then Czechoslovakia.6 His father
was German, and his mother, Katharina, was born in Manayuk,
Pennsylvania, just outside Philadelphia.7 On February 10, 1943,
Breyer became a member of the Waffen Schutzstaffel (SS)' branch
5. Stuart Eizenstat, Keynote Address, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 205,208 (2001), quoted in
Breyer v. Meissner, No. 97-6515, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17869, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18,
2002), affd by Breyer v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2003).
6. See Breyer, No. 97-6515, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17869, at *4.
7. Breyer v. Meissner, No. 97-6515,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18705, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
16, 2001); see also United States v. Breyer, 841 F. Supp. 679, 682-85 (E.D. Pa. 1993), affd
in part and vacated in part (determining that secondary evidence establishes Katharina
Breyer's birth in the United States on December 23, 1897, thus, conflrming her status as an
American citizen).
8. The Waffen SS comprised the armed (militarized) component of the Schutzstaffel
(SS), the virtual empire within an empire upon which historians have laid much of the
responsibility for the planning and systematic implementation of the Holocaust. See
generally, HEINZ HOHNE, THE ORDER OF THE DEATH'S HEAD: THE STORY OF HmLER's S.S.
(Richard Barry trans.,1970) (providing a broad-based history of the role and composition of
the SS within the Third Reich).
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of the German armed forces, at the age of 17, with subsequent
assignment into the SS Totenkopfsturmbann ("Death's Head"
Battalion), a subdivision of the SS, on February 10, 1943 As part
of the SS Totenkopf units, Breyer underwent four weeks of basic
infantry training and swore an oath of allegiance to Adolf Hitler. °
The SS Totenkopfs responsibility during the war was the
armed guarding of the genocidal factories known to history as the
concentration and extermination camps run by the Nazi regime,"
where "inmates were enslaved, tortured, and executed because of
race, religion, national origin, or political beliefs." 2 SS Totenkopf
members wore standard uniforms with the unique "Death's Head"
insignia (skull and crossbones) on their collars,"3 and frequently
engaged in the "inhuman and brutish treatment of prisoners." 4
Breyer served as an armed guard at the Buchenwald
concentration camp from February 1943 to May 1944, and at the
infamous Auschwitz death camp from May to August, 1944."s His
responsibilities at the two camps included orders to "[accompany]
prisoners to and from work sites" and to stand "guard with a loaded
rifle at the perimeter of the camp with orders to shoot any prisoner
who tried to escape." 6 In the camps, the Totenkopf guards were
encouraged to "maximize brutality" in their treatment of prisoners,
including an unchecked ability to punish and execute prisoners for
any reason, including mere personal entertainment. 7
After leaving Auschwitz in August 1 9 4 4 ,"B Breyer joined the
vast mass of refugees wandering across Central Europe. 9 In the
immediate aftermath of the war in 1945, Breyer found work as a
tool-and-die maker in postwar Germany. ° Breyer applied to
immigrate to America in 1952, as the United States was actively
recruiting skilled metal workers to support the war effort in
9. See Breyer, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17869, at *22.
10. Breyer, 2001 U.S. Dist LEXIS 18705, at *2.
11. See HOHNE, supra note 8, at 650. See generally DEBORAH DWORK & ROBERTJAN VAN
PELT, HoLocAusT: A HISTORY (2002) (offering an easily readable and updated history of Nazi
genocidal activities during the Second World War).
12. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 419.
13. United States v. Baumann, 764 F. Supp. 1335, 1335 (E.D. Wis. 1991); K Lesli
Ligorner, Nazi Concentration Camp Guard Service Equals 'Good Moral Character"? United
States v. Lindert, 12 AM. U.J. INTL L. & POLY 145, 158 (1991).
14. Baumann, 764 F. Supp. at 1335.
15. See Breyer, 214 F. 3d at 419.
16. Id.
17. See MICHAEL BURLEIGH, THE THIRD REICH: A NEW HISTORY 200-03 (2000).
18. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 419.
19. See Breyer, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17869, at *39.
20. See id.
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Korea.2 Breyer managed to successfully conceal his wartime
activities while participating in the immigration process, which
allowed him to receive eligibility for a visa as a 'displaced person,'
under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 ("DPA"),22 on March 28,
1952.23 Breyer subsequently entered the United States under an
immigrant visa in May 1952 and became a naturalized United
States citizen in August 1957,24 leading a quiet life and working as
a tool-and-die maker for the next forty years.'
The United States government filed a denaturalization action
against Breyer in 1992 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)2" seeking to
set aside Breyer's American citizenship and cancel his certificate of
naturalization.27 Breyer defended by claiming that in addition to
gaining citizenship by virtue of the Displaced Persons Act, he was
also entitled to American citizenship at birth through his American
born mother.' Before specifically addressing Johann Breyer's
situation, it will be useful to examine the problem of former Nazi
war criminals gaining access to American citizenship in more detail.
21. See id.
22. Pub. L. No. 80-774,62 Stat. 1009,amended by Pub. L. No. 81-555,64 Stat. 219 (1950).
The Displaced Persons Act's stated purpose is "to authorize for a limited period of time the
admission into the United States of certain European displaced persons for permanent
residence..." 262 Stat. 555. The Act defined an "[elligible displaced person" as:
[a] displaced person... (1) who on or after September 1, 1939, and on or before
December 22, 1945, entered Germany, Austria, or Italy or the American sector,
the British Sector, or the French sector of either Berlin or Vienna or the
American zone, the British zone, or the French zone of either Germany or
Austria; or a person who, having resided in Germany or Austria, was a victim
of persecution by the Nazi government and was detained in, or was obliged to
flee from such persecution and was subsequently returned to, one of these
countries as a result of enemy action, or of war circumstances, and on January
1, 1948, had not been firmly resettled therein, and (2) who is qualified for
admission into the United states for permanent residence....
647 Stat. 774 (1948)
The final amended version of the original Displaced Persons Act specifically excludes from
admission into the United States:
[Alny person . . . who is or has been a member of or participated in any
movement which is or has been hostile to the United States or the form of
government of the United States, or to any person who advocated pr assisted
in the persecution of any person because of race, religion, or national origin
262 Stat. 555 (1950).
23. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 419.
24. Id.
25. Maryclaire Dale, U.S. Nazi Hunters Race 'Grim Reaper,' TORONTO STAR, Sept. 24,
2002, at A19.
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(aXmandating the revocation of naturalization in cases of illegally
obtained citizenship).
27. United States v. Breyer, 829 F. Supp. 773, 774 (1993).
28. See id. at 779-80.
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The Problem Of Nazi War Criminals Entering The U.S.
The ease with which Breyer and other Nazi war criminals
entered the United States was a function of the chaotic aftermath
of Germany's surrender. The unprecedented destruction wrought by
the Second World War initiated a massive resettlement of Europe's
populations in the war's aftermath.' Recent estimates reveal that
the war displaced almost eight million people from their homes in
war-torn Europe alone. 3' Approximately one million of these
individuals either refused or were unable to return to their homes
due to the presence of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe and the scale
of destruction.3 1 The majority of these individuals consisted of
liberated concentration camp prisoners, prisoners of war, forced
laborers, and civilian refugees fleeing the advance of the Red Army.32
However, many of the estimated 250,000 former Nazi war
crimes participants 3 took full advantage of the chaotic situation,
anonymously infiltrated the mass of legitimate refugees rendered
homeless by the war, and escaped scrutiny for their crimes.3" An
estimated one thousand to ten thousand" of these barbaric
individuals, including Johann Breyer, immigrated into the United
States as 'legitimate' displaced persons and lived as ordinary
immigrants, escaping accountability for their actions for decades.36
INEFFECTIVE CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO CURTAIL NAZI
IMMIGRATION TO THE U.S.
Under the Constitution, Congress holds the power to grant or to
withhold citizenship and control immigration and naturalization." In
the aftermath of the Second World War, the U.S. Government made
an inspired effort to allow hundreds of thousands of displaced
29. Matthew Lippman, The Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in
Other Anglo-American Legal Systems, 29 CAL. W. INTL. L.J. 1, 13 (1998).
30. Michael Creppy, Nazi War Criminals in Immigration Law, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 443,
444 (1980).
31. Lippman, supra note 29, at 13.
32. Creppy, supra note 30, at 444.
33. Lippman, supra note 29, at 7.
34. See id. at 99.
35. See id. at 50.
36. See generally ALLAN A- RYAN JR., QUIET NEIGHBORS (1984) (discussing the ease with
which Nazi war criminals were able to gain entry into the United States and the sheer scale
and nature of former Nazis living in America).
37. Shari B. Gersten, Note, United States v. Kungys: Clarifying the Materiality Standard
in DeNaturalization Proceedings?, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 429,433 (1989Xciting U.S. CONST. art.
I, §8, cl. 4).
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persons, particularly the victims of Nazi oppression, to immigrate to
the United States to rebuild their shattered lives.' 8
Although the United States attempted to prevent the influx
of individuals who participated in war crimes into the nation in
the aftermath of the Second World War, the means chosen
by Congress to effectuate the dual goals of admission of victims
and exclusion of oppressors proved ineffective at best.39 It will
be useful to examine the most important legislative acts that
attempted to achieve Congress' dual goals of allowing legitimate
refugees into the United States while keeping their persecutors out
of the immigration process.
The first formal legislative attempt by the United States
Government to prevent Nazi war criminals from entering the
country came through its adoption of a provision of the Constitution
of the International Refugee Organization ("IRO") in the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948.40 The impetus for this legislation stemmed
from a mandate from President Truman to allow 200,000 persons
to emigrate from war-torn Europe to the United States without
regard to the standard immigration quotas.4' At this time, the
United States' immigration policy centered around a 'quota system'
which placed a ceiling, restricting the number of potential
immigrants based on the immigrant's geographical place of origin.42
To qualify for a visa under the DPA, an alien had the burden of
proving that he or she was a legitimate displaced person as defined
by the IRO Constitution."3 Essentially, this meant that the potential
immigrant had to prove that he or she was a victim of some form of
38. Creppy, supra note 30, at 444.
39. See RYAN, supra note 36, at 5.
40. The United Nations founded the IRO immediately after the Second World War to
"deal with all aspects of the refugee problem in postwar Europe." Fedorenko v. United States,
449 U.S. 490,496 n.5 (1981) (Service as a concentration camp guard during the Second World
War rendered an individual ineligible for an immigrant visa). This organization created a
"network ofcamps and resettlement centers where ... refugees were registered, housed, fed,
and provided with medical care." See id.
41. Ligorner, supra note 13, at 154; see also supra note 22.
42. Creppy, supra note 30, at 445.
43. See id.
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wartime governmental oppression and had left his or her original
country of residence because of such oppression."
The initial provisions of the DPA concerning the possible
admission of former war criminals specifically forbade the issuance
of immigration visas to persons who had "assisted the enemy in
persecuting civilians," or "voluntarily assisted the enemy forces."45
These provisions also contained a clause that proscribed the
issuance of visas to "former members of movements hostile to the
United States."46 Therefore, this provision of the DPA theoretically
barred former Nazi war criminals from ever attaining eligible
displaced person status.
Those seeking to enter the United States under the DPA also
faced a series of procedures designed to screen applicants for
eligibility. 47 The primary method of ascertaining whether an
applicant was eligible for displaced person status was a series of
interviews conducted by investigators.48 Initially, representatives
of the IRO interviewed each applicant to ascertain whether the
person was a refugee or a displaced person.4 s
The applicant then had to undergo another interview with
officials from the Displaced Persons Commission 0 , who made a
determination regarding the applicant's eligibility for an immigrant
visa.5' State Department and Immigration and Naturalization
Service officials subsequently reviewed this determination.
52
However, these interviews were ineffective as viable background
44. Annex I of the IRO Constitution defined a "displaced person" as:
A person who, as a result of the actions of the authorities of the regimes has
been deported from, or has been obliged to leave his country of nationality or
former habitual residence, such as persons who were compelled to undertake
forced labor or who were deported for racial, religious, or political reasons.
Constitution Int'l Refugee Org, 62 Stat. 3037, Annex I, art. II, para. 1 (entered into force Aug.
20. 1948) cited in Creppy, supra note 30, at 445. The United States ratified the IRO
Constitution on December 16, 1947. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 496 n.3.
45. Ligorner, supra note 13, at 154, (quoting Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495).
46. Id. Section 13 of the Displaced Persons Act (as originally enacted) provides "No visas
shall be issued under the provisions of this Act to any person who is or has been a member
of, or participated in, any movement which is or has been hostile to the United States.. ." 62
Stat. 1014 (1948).
47. David Birnbaum, Note, Denaturalization and Deportation of Nazi War Criminals in
the United States: Upholding Constitutional Procedures in a Single Proceeding, 10 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 201, 207 (1989).
48. Id.
49. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495.
50. The Displaced Persons Commission consisted of three individuals appointed by the
President and was established by the Diplaced persons Act to 'formulate and issue
regulations... for the admission into the United States of.. . eligible displaced persons."
Displaced Persons Act, 62 Stat. 1012, §8 (1948).
51. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 496.
52. Id.
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checks as the "investigators relied solely on information supplied by
the applicant to determine eligibility." 3 Therefore, it was relatively
easy for former Nazis to misrepresent the nature of their wartime
activities to investigators, and thus, to obtain eligibility for a
Displaced Persons visa under the DPA of 1948."' This is evidenced
by the fact that an estimated ten thousand Nazi collaborators and
war criminals immigrated to the United States with visas that had
been granted under the Displaced Persons Act."5
The next important component of Congressional immigration
legislation relating to Nazi war criminals remains the backbone for
much of current U.S. immigration law. Congress passed the
Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") of 195256 in an attempt to
combine the multiple areas of immigration and naturalization into
a single piece of legislation. 7 Section 1451(a) of the INA still
provides a basis for revoking a suspected war criminal's citizenship.'
Section 1451(a) provides that citizenship "illegally procured," or
"procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation" shall be revoked.'9 Section 1451(a) would
eventually become the primary statutory authority for revoking a
suspected Nazi's citizenship in principle, although it would take
decades before Section 1451(a) would become widely used in such
a manner.
60
Although the DPA officially expired in 1951, Congress decided
to pass similar legislation to address the continuing problems posed
by refugees in Europe and to provide a vehicle for refugees fleeing
the shadow of the Iron Curtain."' This legislation, the Refugee
Relief Act of 1953,62 actually made it easier, at least statutorily, for
Nazi war criminals to enter the United States than the DPA it
replaced as it did not contain any explicit language identifying Nazi
persecutors as a class ineligible for immigration visas, as the DPA
had.63 Conversely, the Refugee Relief Act used broader language in
denying immigration visas to any person who "personally advocated
53. Birnbaum, supra note 47, at 208.
54. See id.
55. RYAN, supra note 36, at 26.
56. Codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1557 (2003).
57. Susan H. Lin, Comment, Aliens Beware: Recent United States Legislative Efforts to
Exclude andRemoveAlienHumanRightsAbusers, 15 EMORYINTLL.REv. 733,737 n.22 (2001).
58. Birnbaum, supra note 47, at 209.
59. Fedorenko 449 U.S. 490 at 496 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)).
60. See generally RYAN, supra note 36 (discussing the long delay in actual effective
prosecution of Nazi war criminals).
61. Creppy, supra note 30, at 447.
62. Pub. L. No. 751,67 Stat. 400, amended by Act of Aug. 31, 1954,68 Stat. 1044 (1954).
63. Ligorner, supra note 13, at 155-56 n.61-62.
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or assisted in the persecution of any person or group of persons
because of race, religion, or national origin." The reason for this
shift to broader statutory language in the RRA stemmed from the
emergence of the Cold War and the view that a potential
immigrant's Communist leanings were more dangerous than the
issue of whether an immigrant served as a Nazi during the Second
World War.65 Thus, even with the expiration of the relatively porous
DPA, its replacement was calibrated toward battling the spread of
Communism rather than keeping former Nazis from immigrating
to America's shores.
Breyer's Entry into the United States
An examination of Johann Breyer's immigration to the United
States and his eventual naturalization illustrates how the flaws
in the postwar immigration policy allowed war criminals to legally
enter the United States. Breyer applied to the U.S. Displaced
Persons Commission in May of 1951 to be categorized as a displaced
person under the DPA for the purpose of obtaining a visa
to immigrate to the U.S." Initially, the interviewer rejected
Breyer's application, because Breyer admitted that he had served
in the Waffen SS. 7 However, the criteria changed months later,
reflecting the passage of the more lenient RRA, and mere
membership in the Waffen SS was no longer considered a bar to
displaced person status.'
Breyer did not disclose his service in the SS Totenkopf
sturmbanne, but admitted serving in the Waffen SS in a subsequent
interview with the Displaced Persons Commission in which he was
certified as a displaced person eligible for a visa.69 Breyer then
applied for and received permission to immigrate to the United
States as an alien, entering the United States in May, 1952.70 Five
years after entering the United States, Breyer filed a petition for
naturalization and the District Court for the Eastern District of
64. Id. (quoting Section 14 of the RRA, see supra note 62).
65. See RYAN, supra note 36, at 327.
66. United States v. Breyer, 41 F.3d 884, 886 (3rd Cir. 1994).
67. See id. The Waffen SS constituted the militarized component of the SS and was
organized into division-sized units which fought on all fronts of World War II in front-line
actions and were regarded as elite infantry forces. The Totenkopfsturmbanne was a
subsection of the Waffen SS that generally only guarded concentration camps. See HOHNE,
supra note 7, at 436-82.
68. Breyer, 41 F.3d at 886.
69. See id.
70. See id.
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Pennsylvania issued Breyer a certificate of naturalization."v
Therefore, even though Breyer was initially denied displaced
persons status because of suspicions concerning his wartime
service, the relaxation of the requirements brought on by the Cold
War and the passage of the Refugee Relief Act allowed him to
receive his immigrant visa and eventually become a United
States citizen.
LATER ATTEMPTS BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO
DENATURALIZE AND REMOVE NAZI WAR CRIMINALS WHO HAD
GAINED ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES
Congress Strikes Back - The Holtzman Amendment and the
Formation of the OSI
The porous nature of previous Congressional attempts to shield
the United States from an influx of former Nazi persecutors
persuaded Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman to introduce and
sponsor the most important piece of legislation relating to Nazi war
criminals living in the United States.72 The Act of October 30, 1978,
known as the Holtzman Amendment", "modified the Immigration
and Nationality Act specifically to exclude Nazi war criminals from
eligibility to receive entry visas," and also made ex-Nazis deportable
if found inside the United States.74 The Holtzman Amendment
"applies to any alien who, between March 23, 1933, and May 8,
1945, in conjunction with the Nazi government or an associated
government, 'ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in
the persecution of any person because of race, religion, national
origin, or political opinion."
75
It is important to note that the Holtzman Amendment reveals
a conscious decision to rely on the two-step process of
denaturalization and deportation rather than criminal prosecution
to remove former Nazis from mainstream American society.76 This
reliance on deportation and denaturalization possesses the practical
71. See id.
72. Robert A. Cohen, Note, United States Exclusion and Deportation of Nazi War
Criminals: the Act of October 30, 1978, 13 N.Y.U. J. IMOL L. & POL. 101, 112 (1980).
73. Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 codified at 8 U.S.C. §1227(aX4XDX2003)XGeneral
Classes of Deportable Aliens). See also 8 U.S.C. § 1182(aX3)(EXi), (ii) (Inadmissible Aliens.)
74. Lippman, supra note 29, at 51.
75. Id (quoting Holtzman Amendment, Act of Oct. 30, 1978, codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1182(aX3XE)).
76. Lippman, supra note 29, at 52-53.
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advantage of requiring that the government seeking to remove the
accused war criminal satisfy a mere civil statutory standard of
proof, rather than a more rigorous criminal burden of proof."
The majority of former Nazi war criminals that the government
wishes to prosecute have surreptitiously acquired United States
citizenship, consequently, immigration laws no longer apply to
them.78 This is because United States citizens are not subject to
immigration laws, regardless of how their citizenship was obtained.79
Therefore, the government cannot simply deport ex-Nazis, but must
denaturalize them first, stripping them of their citizenship and
reverting them to 'alien' status, before initiating removal
proceedings to force them out of the country.8 °
The right to acquire United States citizenship is "a precious
one," and once an individual has acquired that citizenship, "its loss
can have severe and unsettling consequences."" It is for these
reasons that the Supreme Court has mandated that "(tihe
Government"carries a heavy burden of proof in a proceeding to divest
a naturalized citizen of his citizenship."82 The evidence presented in
a revocation of citizenship action must be "clear. unequivocal, and
convincing and not leave the issue in doubt."'
When the government brings a succesful denaturalization
proceeding against a former Nazi war criminal, the individual is
stripped of his or her citizenship and essentially becomes an alien
again." The alien ex-Nazi appears before an Immigration Judge,
and at the judge's discretion, may be physically removed from the
77. See id. at 53.
78. Stacey Belisle, Note, United States v. Balsys: The United States Supreme Court Takes
A Stand to Maintain the Fifth Amendment's Integrity, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 341, 351.
This distinction is crucial as "[ijn the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to
citizens." Matthews v. Diaz, 427 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (discussing distinctions between aliens
and citizens and holding that aliens are not entitled to enjoy all of the benefits of citizenship).
79. Creppy, supra note 30, at 455.
80. See id.
81. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505 (citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265,269 (1961)
(explaining that "in view of the grave consequences to the citizen, naturalization decrees are
not lightly to be set aside" Id.); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 676 (1944) (".
.. citizenship once bestowed should not be in jeopardy nor in fear of exercising its American
freedom through a too easy finding that citizenship was disloyally acquired. We... require
solid proof that citizenship was falsely and fraudulently procured." Id.); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125(1942) (.... rights once conferred should not be lightly
revoked. And more especially is this true when the rights are precious and when they are
conferred by solemn adjudication, as is the situation when citizenship is granted." Id.).
82. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 505 (quoting Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. at 269).
83. Id. (citing Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125).
84. See Belisle, supra note 78, at 353.
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United States.85 A Nazi war criminal cannot avoid removal from the
United States by alleging that he or she would be persecuted if
forced to return to his or her homeland.86
As a corollary to the Holtzman Amendment, and to assist in the
Amendment's implementation and enforcement, the Attorney
General of the United States created the Office of Special
Investigations ("OSI") in 1979.7 The OSI operates as part of the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice and is responsible
for identifying and investigating suspected Nazis. 8 The OSI, using
a staff comprised of historians and attorneys, also initiates and
prosecutes the denaturalization and deportation legal actions
against suspected Nazis. 9 The OSI usually initiates actions based
on the immigrant's illegal procurement of citizenship, or willful and
material misrepresentations during the naturalization process,
and/or failure to possess the requisite good moral character.9 To
date, the OSI has closed well over one thousand cases and has
many more under investigation.9'
Legal Standards In Denaturalization Cases
The first seminal denaturalization case established that an
alien has neither a moral nor a constitutional right to retain the
privileges associated with citizenship if naturalization would have
been denied but for false statements made by the applicant at the
time of admission.92 However, the applicant's false statements must
be material. In the subsequent case of Chaunt v. United States,9"
the Supreme Court mandated a two-part test to determine the
materiality of an applicant's misrepresentations: either "the
suppressed facts, if known, would have warranted a denial of
citizenship, or that the disclosure of these facts might have been
useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other
85. Id.
86. See Creppy, supra note 30, at 462.
87. See Lin, supra note 57, at 739.
88. See id.
89. See Creppy, supra note 30, at 455.
90. See Ligorner, supra note 13, at 453.
91. See Creppy, supra note 30.
92. Johanessenv. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 241-43 (1912)cited in Gersten,supra note
37, at 438.
93. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
A NAZI WAR CRIMINAL
facts warranting a denial of citizenship." The government must
prove either part of the test with "clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence.""5
The important case of United States v. Fedorenko8 established
the legal standards involving the denaturalization and removal of
Nazi war criminals from the United States.97 Fedorenko was a
concentration camp guard at various Nazi camps during the war,
who claimed that the Germans forced him to perform such duties
and denied participation in any atrocities. 98 The Court ruled that
disclosure of the facts concerning Fedorenko's service as an armed
concentration camp guard would have, as a matter of law, made
him ineligible for a visa under the DPA.9 Thus, Fedorenko
confirmed that "an individual's capacity in serving the Third Reich
can, in and of itself, establish the individual's involvement in Nazi-
sponsored persecution."100 This is significant as it establishes no
requirement to prove the individual's actual participation in
wartime atrocities, which is problematic as the events in question
occurred well over a half-century ago; mere service in certain Nazi
units is sufficient to allow denaturalization and deportation.101
Therefore, in Johann Breyer's case, the OSI would only have to
prove that Breyer actually served in a Waffen SS Totenskopf unit
during the war to successfully prove that Breyer would have been
ineligible to receive an immigrant visa.
The Johann Breyer Saga- From Genocide to Upholding Gender
Neutrality
On April 21, 1992, the OSI filed a "five-count complaint under
section 1451(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act to revoke
and set aside Johann Breyer's naturalized United States citizenship
on the grounds that it was illegally procured.., or was procured by
concealment or willful misrepresentation.... 02 Breyer, in an
unusual and landmark step, conceded that he never mentioned his
service as a concentration camp guard in the Second World War but
raised the affirmative defense that his citizenship derived from his
94. See id. at 352 cited in Gersten, supra note 37, at 440.
95. Chaunt, 364 U.S. at 352-54 (1960) cited in Gersten, supra note 37, at 441.
96. 449 U.S. 490.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 494.
99. Id. at 513-14.
100. Ligorner, supra note 13, at 166 (discussing Federenko, 449 U.S 490).
101. See id.
102. Breyer, 41 F.3d at 887.
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mother, an alleged United States Citizen." 3 Thus, the battle lines
were drawn in a protracted and contentious war over Breyer's
denaturalization, but one that would have important symbolic
effects on women's rights in America.
A person born in the United States is automatically deemed a
United States citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment.'0 4 A
person born outside of the United States may also have a statutory
right to United States derivative citizenship through certain
familial relationships." 5 Usually, this involves the passing of
citizenship to the child, at birth, from its United States citizen
parents. "6 Breyer claimed that the OSI could not denaturalize him,
because when he entered the country in 1952, he did so lawfully, as
a United States citizen."°7 Breyer asserted that he derived
citizenship at birth through his mother, whom he claimed was born
near Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.'08 Following a four-day bench trial
on the issue of Katarina Susanna Breyer's birthplace, the District
Court held that secondary evidence proved that Breyer's mother
was indeed born in the United States on December 23, 1897.1' The
District Court accorded particular weight to baptismal records, a
1930 Czechoslovak census, and post war documents signed by
Breyer's mother."'
When Johann Breyer was born on May 30, 1925, in
Czechoslovakia, section 1993 of the Revised Statutes of 18741"
awarded United States citizenship to foreign-born offspring of
United States citizen fathers, but not to the offspring of United
States citizen mothers."2 A court noted that gender-based
distinctions had existed in laws of this nature since 1790, allowing
only a citizen father to pass his citizenship by right of blood.1
3
Section 1993 was amended in 1934 to make it gender neutral so
103. Id.
104. Id. at 887 n.2.
105. See Breyer, 41 F.3d at 887.
106. See id.
107. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 420.
108. Id.
109. Breyer, 841 F. Supp. at 684.
110. See id.
111. Rev. Stat. § 1993 (1874)(reenacting Section 1 ofActofFeb. 10, 1855, ch.71,10 Stat. 604)
All children heretofore born or hereafter born out of the limits and jurisdiction
of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth
citizens thereof, are declared to be citizens of the United States; but the rights
of citizenship shall not descend to children whose fathers never resided in the
United States.
Id. cited in Wauchope v. United States Dep't of State, 985 F.2d 1407,1410 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993).
112. Breyer, 829 F.Supp. at 780.
113. United States v. Breyer, 23 F.Supp.2d 521, 525 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
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that any child born thereafter, outside of the United States to either
a United States citizen father or mother would be considered a
United States citizen so long as the child fulfilled certain residency
requirements.1 4 Because Congress specifically chose not to make
the 1934 gender-neutral amendment to §1993 retroactive, the
previous version containing the gender-based distinction continued
to govern the citizenship status of persons born before 1934,
including Johann Breyer. " 5
In 1994, Congress finally took action to make the 1934
amendment retroactive for those born before 1934 by passing
Section 101(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Technical
Corrections Act ("INTCA")." 6 Section 101(c)(1) amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act to confer citizenship at birth to "a
person born before noon (Eastern Standard Time) May 24, 1934,
outside the limits and jurisdiction of the United States of an alien
father and a mother who is a citizen of the United States who, prior
to the birth of such person, had resided in the United States."" 7
This amendment contained an important exception - Section
101(c)(2) stated that the retroactive application "shall not confer
citizenship on, or affect the validity of any denaturalization,
deportation, or exclusion action against, any person who would not
have been eligible for admission to the United States under the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948. " I"' This effectively meant that the
gender-based distinction present in the non-retroactive version of
section 1993 would remain in place for children of American-born
mothers who had participated in Nazi persecution during the
Second World War. Breyer sought to challenge the constitutionality
of both Section 1993 and INTCA § 101(c)(2) because they denied his
American citizen mother her right to pass on her citizenship to her
offspring, while the statutes would confer United States citizenship
onasimilarly situated childifthe child's fatherhadbeenAmerican. "9
114. Id. (citing Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 344, § 1, 48 Stat. 797)("any child hereafter born
out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose father or mother or both at the
time of the birth of such child is a citizen of the United States, is declared to be a citizen of
the United States" Id.).
115. See Breyer, 214 F.3d at 421-22.
116. 103d Congress Oct. 25, 1994 108 STAT. 4305[H.R. 783]Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat.
4305, 4306 (1994); see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
117. Pub. L. No. 103-416 (1994) at 4306. INTCA. § 101(c)(2) 8 U.S.C. 1401(hX2003) cited
in Breyer, 214 F.3d at 422.
118. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 422 (quoting Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. (1994) at 4306. INTCA
§ 101(cX2)).
119. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 422.
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JOHANN BREYER'S SUCCESSFUL BID TO OBTAIN
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP
Third Circuit's Analysis of Breyer's Section 1993 Claim
In examining the constitutionality of Section 1993, the Third
Circuit first ruled that Breyer was entitled to assert his mother's
equal protection rights pursuant to the doctrine of third-party
standing. 20 The Supreme Court has ruled that one seeking to
assert third party rights must demonstrate injury in fact, a close
relationship to the third party, and a hindrance to the third party
asserting its own rights. 2' The Third Circuit correctly concluded
that Breyer met all of these prerequisites for asserting a violation
of his mother's equal protection rights: his own alleged deprivation
of citizenship constituted an injury in fact, the closeness of a son's
relationship to his mother satisfied the close relationship test, and
his mother's death certainly prevented her from asserting her own
rights. 2 The Third Circuit's determination that Breyer had
standing to assert his mother's rights is crucial to the outcome of
the case, as it allowed Breyer to invoke heightened scrutiny in the
examination of the gender-based classification.'23 If Breyer had not
been able to assert his mother's rights in his claim for citizenship,
his claim likely would have failed, as mere rational basis scrutiny
would have been invoked."2 The Third Circuit distinguished this
case from previous cases that had considered the equal protection
rights of naturalized persons themselves and found heightened
scrutiny inapplicable."2
The Third Circuit also distinguished Breyer's assertion of his
mother's rights from Miller v. Albright. 26 In Miller, the Supreme
120. See id. at 423.
121. See Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392,397 (1998) (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 411 (1991)).
122. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 423; see, e.g., Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1410-11 (allowing foreign-born
children of American mothers standing to challenge the constitutionality of Section 1993).
123. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 424. ("Because [Section 19931 created a gender classification with
respect to Breyer's mother's ability to pass her citizenship to her foreign-born child at his
birth, the section is subject to heightened scrutiny." Id.).
124. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996) (explaining a legislative
classification that neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets suspect class will be
upheld on rational basis review).
125. See Breyer, 214 F.3d at 424; Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 995 (1986) (refusing heightened scrutiny to Nazi war criminals after
assertion of equal protection rights by the naturalized individuals).
126. 523 U.S. 420 (1998).
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Court upheld a gender-based statutory distinction between the
granting of citizenship automatically to illegitimate children born
abroad to American mothers and requiring illegitimate offspring of
American fathers born abroad to present formal proof of
paternity. 12 Although the Supreme Court only applied rational
basis scrutiny, 2 ' the Third Circuit properly distinguished the
statute at issue in Miller from Section 1993 in that "the offspring
seeking citizenship under § 1993 are not illegitimate" and do not
require any further act of acknowledgment on the part of the parent
other than the birth of the child itself."
Section 1993's use of a gender-based classification does not
survive the mandated heightened level of scrutiny when applied
to the mother of the foreign-born child. The heightened level of
scrutiny requires parties who seek to defend gender-based
government action to demonstrate an "exceedingly persuasive
justification" for that action. " In addition, an exceedingly persuasive
justification must be proffered even if the statute at issue is
designed to remedy past gender-based discrimination.' The
discrimination in question must serve important government
objectives and the discriminatory means used to achieve those
objectives must be substantially related to those objectives.3 2
The Third Circuit correctly surmised that the government did
not provide any justification at all with regards to Section 1993 in
support of the gender classification that prevented Breyer's mother
from conveying her citizenship at the birth of her son. 33 The
government insisted that Breyer's case was only about "the
government's right to deny entry and citizenship to Nazis and like
individuals," and argued that Breyer's claim should be considered
only under the INTCA (considered infra).'"' Because the government
chose not to present a defense to Breyer's Section 1993 claim, the
Third Circuit refused to surmise one, concluding that "[t]here is no
support in the case law for surmising a defense for the government
in gender discrimination cases, where it has not offered one." 3 1 In
finding Section 1993 an unconstitutional violation of Katharina
Breyer's equal protection rights, the Third Circuit cited opinions
127. Id. at 426-28, 441-45.
128. Id. at 441.
129. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 424.
130. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
131. See id. at 533, 536.
132. Id. at 533.
133. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 426.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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from the Ninth Circuit and two United States District Courts
13 6
that found Section 1993 unconstitutional even under the more
lenient rational basis test. 137 However, in determining that Section
1993 was unconstitutional, none of the other courts were faced with
the unique dilemma of allowing a Nazi war criminal to gain
American citizenship as a result of ruling the statute invalid. That
the Third Circuit was willing to accept this dilemma marks an
important symbolic place of primacy for the gender-neutral
application of American laws in modern society.
Third Circuit's Analysis of Section 101(c)(2) Claim
Breyer also claimed that Section 101(c)(2) of the INTCA
exacerbated the discriminatory impact of Section 1993 in that it
deprived his mother of the right to pass on her citizenship to him
due to wrongdoing on his part, where he could not know the
consequences of his actions."' The government presented two
justifications for Section 101(c)(2). First, it argued that Section
101(c)(2) remedied the gender distinction present in Section 1993
by "ensuring the equal treatment of all foreign born children who
have committed expatriating acts," by denying United States
citizenship.'39 The government's second justification for Section
101(c)(2) was its protection of national security."0 They argued that
Section 101(c)(2) ensures the integrity of American citizenship by
preventing United States citizenship from passing to persons
having committed genocide."'
The decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania recognized that heightened scrutiny is
generally the appropriate standard for equal protection challenges
based on gender discrimination." 2 The court applies a lower level
of scrutiny, however, demonstrating its great deference to Congress
136. See Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1416 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding no facially legitimate and bona
fide reason for unequal treatment of citizen men and women); Aguayo v. Christopher, 865 F.
Supp. 479,490 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (using rational basis test, finding Section 1993 unconstitutional
on gender lines); Elias v. U.S. Dep't of State, 721 F. Supp. 243, 249 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (finding
§1993 unconstitutional because of differential treatment of men and women).
137. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 426.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See supra note 133 and accompanying text
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in immigration and naturalization matters. 1 3 Citing the Fiallo144
standard on the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration
legislation, the lower court ruled that Congress need only show a
"facially legitimate and bona fide reason" to enact a discriminatory
rule regarding immigration or naturalization. 145 The lower court
also cited Miller v. Albright 46 in ruling that when Congress
determines by statute which foreign born persons acquire citizenship
at birth, a narrow standard of review applies because of the
traditional deference given to the legislative branch in matters of
immigration and naturalization. 47
The district court further elaborated its desire to review Section
101(c)(2) under a lenient standard by mandating that a statute
conferring citizenship at birth is an exercise of the naturalization
power of Congress and not within the automatic nature of citizenship
acquired under the Constitution.14 8 The district court emphasized
that "[aibsent valid naturalization, persons born outside the
jurisdiction of the United States are assumed by the Constitution
to be aliens,"' 49 who may only obtain citizenship "as provided by
Acts of Congress."'" Quoting the language of Fiallo, the lower court
emphasized that "'over no conceivable subject is the legislative
power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of
143. Breyer, 2 F. Supp. at 531-32. The court specifically acknowledged Congress' "plenary
authority" in the areas of immigration and naturalization. Id. at 532.
144. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
145. Breyer, 23 F. Supp. 2d. at 531-32 (citing Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792-94. The facially
legitimate and bona fide reason test is equivalent to the rational basis test. Id. at 533 (citing
Ablang v. Reno, 52 F.3d 801, 804 (9th Cir. 1995); Wauchope, 985 F.2d at 1414 n.3; Azizi v.
Thornburgh, 908 F.2d 1130, 1133 n.2 (2d Cir. 1990)).
146. 523 U.S. 407 (1998).
147. Breyer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (citing Miller, 118 S. Ct., at 1437 n.l1).
148. Breyer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 532 (citing United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
702-03 (1898)).
A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a
citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty. . . or by authority of congress,
exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the
enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens...
Id.
149. Id. at 533 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.) (The constitution extends United States
citizenship only to "persons born or naturalized in the United States").
150. Id. (quoting Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S., at 703).
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aliens."'5 ' Hence, the lower court only "required a facially legitimate
and bona fide reason for the gender classification at issue."'5 2
In applying the rational basis test to Section 101(c)(2), the
lower court examined whether the differential treatment of groups
imposed by the statute was related to a legitimate objective of the
government. 5 ' The first stated governmental objective of Section
101(c)(2) was to ensure equal treatment of all foreign-born children
of United States citizen parents who have committed expatriating
acts.'54 The lower court found this constituted a legitimate
governmental objective and concluded that there was a rational
relation between Section 101(c)(2) and the achievement of this
objective.'55 The lower court focused on the effect of Section
101(c)(2) in equalizing the effects of expatriating conduct on
children of American citizen mothers, and not the effects of the
statute on the mothers themselves. 5 " In fact, in a footnote
contained in the district court's opinion, the court indicates that
even if heightened scrutiny were applied to challenge Section
101(c)(2), the gender-based distinction would pass muster due to
the nature of the governmental objectives dealing with keeping
participants in Nazi genocide out of the country.'57
In declaring Section 101(c)(2) unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit correctly pointed out that the lower court's imposition
of rational basis review was primarily and erroneously predicated
151. Breyer, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 533 (quoting Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (quoting Oceanic
Navigation Co. v. Stanhan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))). The court also recognized that "[tihe
Congressional power to exclude aliens has long been recognized by the [Supreme] Court 'as
a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments
largely immune from judicial control. Id. at 533 (quoting Shaugnnessy v. United States, ex.
rel. Mezei 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953).)
152. Id. (citing Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 794).
153. Id. at 533. Under the easily satisfied rational basis standard, legislation fails only
when "the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the
achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that [one] can only conclude that the
legislature's actions were irrational." Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
154. Id. at 534. To establish an expatriating act, the government must prove intent to
relinquish citizenship. The voluntary participation in Nazi genocidal activities is recognized
as satisfying an intent to relinquish citizenship. See United States v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp.
1166, 1183 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
155. Breyer, 23 F. Supp 2d at 535.
156. See id.
157. Id. at 537 n.l1 stating:
the governmental objectives of national security , foreign policy, and the
promotion of human rights are important ones, and there exists a substantial
relationship between the differential treatment and the achievement of those
objectives... I find the reasons cited to constitute an exceedingly persuasive
justification for the discriminatory provision.
Id. at 537 n.11 (internal quotations, citations omitted).
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on its view that Breyer was asserting his own rights in his equal
protection claim, instead of those of his mother.' Because Breyer
was asserting the equal protection rights of his mother, an
American citizen, to pass on her citizenship her foreign-born
offspring, the traditional judicial deference given to Congress in
matters of immigration and naturalization could not apply."9 A
shift in the focus of the debate from an assertion of Breyer's rights
to the ability of Breyer's mother to effectively transmit her
citizenship to her foreign-born offspring completely eliminates any
need for the judicial deference traditionally given towards Acts of
Congress relating to immigration and naturalization. This is
because Breyer's mother was an American citizen by virtue of her
birth in Pennsylvania.16 The Third Circuit points out that Section
101(c)(2) affects a particular subset of children born to American
citizen mothers, those children who would become participants in
Nazi genocide, who continued to be excluded from citizenship.'
The Third Circuit tellingly points to the legislative history of
Section 101(c)(2), that reveals Congress' specific intent to exclude
some American women whose offspring had committed expatriating
acts from the remedial "cure" of Section 101(c)(2). 6 2
Instead of eliminating all gender-based discrimination under
the old statute, Section 1993 of the Revised Statutes of 1874,
INTCA Section 101(c)(2) reimposed that discrimination by requiring
a different test for the foreign born children of American citizen
mothers than it does for the foreign born children of American
citizen fathers. 63 Under Section 101(c)(2), foreign-born children of
American fathers would acquire citizenship at birth and could only
158. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 426-27.
159. See id. at 427.
160. See supra text accompanying note 7.
161. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 426-27. "Thus, while §101(cXl) cured the discriminatory effects
of§1993, as written in 1925 and amended in 1934, §101(c)(2) took away that cure for a subset
of American mothers whose foreign-born off-spring have committed certain acts." Id. at 427
162. Id. The comments of Rep. Schumer are particularly illustrative:
t .i. [ here are several Nazi expatriation cases pending in the United States
that would be jeopardized if Nazi children of American mothers were to be
naturalized. Nazis born to American fathers do not have this problem ...
Proper prosecution of these individuals depends on the ability to denaturalize
and deport them to stand trial overseas for war crimes.
Id. at 427 (quoting statements of Rep. Schumer, Col. 140, No. 132 Cong. Rec. H9280 (daily
ed. Sept. 20, 1994)). Therefore, it seems apparent that the members of Congress who
sponsored Section 101(cX2) were aware of its potential to maintain gender-based
discriminatory treatment on a unique subset of American women, and in fact, welcomed such
discriminatory treatment.
163. Breyer, 214 F.3d, at 428.
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be forced to relinquish citizenship upon their commission of
intentional expatriating acts. 1
64
Conversely, the foreign-born children of American mothers who
have committed similar acts with or without an intent to expatriate
themselves would be precluded from obtaining American citizenship
at all. 165 The Third Circuit correctly found this treatment difference
in the ability of American fathers and mothers to transmit their
citizenship to their offspring is an "additional burden . . . in
fundamental tension with the principle of equal protection."'66 As
such, the Third Circuit held that Section 101(c)(2) as applied to
Breyer's citizen mother violated equal protection by "perpetuating
the gender discrimination contained in [Section] 1993, which
prevented [Breyer's] mother from transmitting citizenship to him
at birth."'67 In ruling that the equal protection rights of Johann
Breyer's American mother were violated, the Third Circuit found
that Breyer was entitled to American citizenship at birth, and
remanded Breyer's claim to the district court for a determination of
whether Breyer's actions in the Second World War constituted
voluntary expatriating acts."s
CONCLUSION
The barbarous state-sponsored genocide unleashed upon
Europe during the Second World War against millions of innocent
human beings by the Nazi government of Germany "remains the
embodiment of man's most profound capacity for evil."
169
Individuals like Johann Breyer who participated in the inhuman
164. Id. The government must prove that a citizen has intended to relinquish citizenship
to successfully demonstrate that a citizen has expatriated himself and is eligible for removal
and loss of citizenship. See id. (citing Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 270 (1980)).
165. Breyer, 214 F.3d at 428.
166. Id. ("We find no legitimate reason for such disparate treatment of American citizen
mothers that is sufficient to override their guarantee to equal protection of the laws.") The
Third Circuit also rejected the government's rationale regarding the protection of national
security as one of the reasons to allow the gender-based distinction to survive. Id. at 429.
"[Tihe cases that the [lower court] cites to support its conclusion that the government's
national security justification for § 101(c)(2) is rational refer only to alienage... [t]hese cases
do not control the interests of American citizen mothers or their foreign-born children. .
167. Id. at 429.
168. Id. at 429-32. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania found, on remand, that Breyer's wartime service in the SS Totenkopfdid not
constitute a voluntary expatriating act, primarily based on the fact that Breyer was 17 years
old when he joined the SS. Breyer therefore retained his American citizenship. See Breyer
v. Meissner, No. 97-6515, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17869 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2002); Shannon
P. Duffy, Immigration Federal Court Allows Ex-Guard at Auschwitz to Stay in U.S., PA. L.
WEEKLY, Sept. 30, 2002, at 6.
169. RYAN, supra note 36, at 4.
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treatment of Holocaust victims, are the perpetrators of profound
evil and are among the most morally repugnant members of society
because of their deeds. This is exactly why the Third Circuit's
decision in the Johann Breyer case is so important as a benchmark
of gender equality in modern America.
The invalidation of two Acts of Congress that blatantly
conditioned the ability of American citizens to convey their
"precious right"'7 ° of American citizenship to their foreign-born
offspring on the basis of their gender sends a clear message that
gender-based discrimination has no place in modern America. This
anti-discriminatory policy is made even more evident when
considering the Third Circuit's invalidation of INTCA Section
101(c)(2). Section 101(c)(2) was specifically targeted to prevent
foreign-born children of American mothers who had matured into
Nazi oppressors from gaining citizenship. The Third Circuit's
invalidation of Section 101(c)(2) allowed former Nazi war criminals
such as Johann Breyer the ability to legally claim American
citizenship. Allowing Breyer the ability to claim American
citizenship and thus, to receive the full protections and guarantees
afforded to citizens under the law, may not be a desirable outcome
considering his participation in the Holocaust.
However, the fact that Breyer's American citizen mother and
other similarly situated women gained the right to pass American
citizenship to their children at birth, when throughout history
Congress had allowed similarly situated fathers the same right, is
a laudable result given the goal of maintaining the gender-neutral
application of our laws to all. The Third Circuit's decision is
therefore one that should be celebrated as a convincing example
that gender-based discrimination will not be tolerated by the
United States judiciary, even at the price of allowing an admitted
Nazi war criminal to claim status as an American citizen.
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